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Case No. 20150847-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
ELIZABETH V.COOK,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Defendant appeals from a conviction for Driving under the Influence of
Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor dated October 6, 2015 by the Honorable Keith C.
Barnes of the Fifth District Court, in and for Iron County, State of Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e). (West Supp.
2015).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Point I. Ms. Cook claims the trial court improperly interpreted UT AH

CODE ANN. 41-6a-502(1) to conclude that the Defendant exhibited "actual
physical control" over a four-wheeler while under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Utah law. Ms. Cook alleged that she was merely a passenger while
her 10 year old daughter operated the four-wheeler. At trial, when asked if he
1

had observed who was steering the four-wheeler Deputy Burton testified that he
saw Ms. Cook with her hands on the handlebars of the four-wheeler. R 7:11-14.
Ms. Cook admitted to placing her hands on the handlebars when she claimed
that she was attempting to protect her daughter while they came to a stop. R
32:6-11. On direct examination, Ms. Cook's daughter was asked by Mr. Burns
whether Ms. Cook was helping her steer the four-wheeler. The daughter replied,
"She did at first because I was almost crashed into the thing, and then she's like,
'Tum this way,' and all she did was hold my shoulders." R 46:18-20. The totality
of circumstances shows that Ms. Cook exhibited actual physical control of the
four-wheeler. She was maneuvering the handlebars as observed by Deputy
Burton, she admitted to placing her hands on the handlebars while coming to a
stop, and her daughter testified that the defendant was helping her steer the
four-wheeler. The trial court properly found that Ms. Cook was in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6a-502{1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or
Drugs.

Point II. At trial Ms. Cook objected on a foundational basis to the

admissibility of her BAC test results and now claims that the trial court
committed error in determining that the Baker fifteen minuet observation periods
had been sufficiently met in order for Cook's BAC to be admissible. However,
2

the State presented evidence sufficient to meet the standard three step
foundational requirement for the Baker test. The State presented evidence that
the Intoxilyzer machine had been properly checked by a trained technician and
that the machine was in proper working condition at the time of the test. Deputy
Burton testified that he had been certified to use the Intoxilyzer and the State
submitted certificates showing that the Intoxilyzer was calibrated at the time Ms.
Cook was tested. R 14:6-16. The State also showed that Deputy Burton observed
the defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately preceding the test to
ensure that the defendant introduced nothing into her mouth during that time.
Deputy Burton testified he observed the Baker time at 14:34. R 17:13. Deputy
Burton then testified that he did not leave the room for any reason and observed
that Ms. Cook had not belched or regurgitated anything, nor did she eat or drink
prior to submitting a breath sample at the time of 14:51. R 17:20-23, R 18:12. The
trial court found that the fifteen minutes required by Baker had been met. R 23:1516. The court was satisfied that Deputy Burton's method of marking time that left
a two minuet cushion of seventeen minuets from when Baker was observed and
when the test was administered were enough to meet the requirement. R 23:1718.
Point III. Defendant fails to rebut the strong presumption that his counsel

reasonably chose not to follow through on his motion to suppress evidence. Trial
3

counsels decision to file, or not to file a motion to suppress is merely a legitimate
strategic choice, which will not be questioned and viewed as ineffectiveness
unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision. Cook has failed to meet her
burden as required by Strickland in establishing an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim when trial counsel had a reasonable basis for that decision.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
DEFENDANT EXHIBITED ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF
THE FOUR-WHEELER WHILE INTOXICATED TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION FOR DUI.

A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within
the state of Utah if there is "sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test" UTAH CODE ANN.
41-6a-502(1).

An off-highway vehicle is considered a motor vehicle. UTAH CODE ANN.
41-22-2(11)(b). An "Operator" has been defined as a "person who is in actual
physical control of an off-highway vehicle" UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(15).
"[A]ctual physical control' in its ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." State v.

4

Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, 21, 89 P.3d 209 (citations omitted). A person need not
actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle in order to have actual physical
control; the person only needs to have "the apparent ability to start and mo_ve the
vehicle." State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473,477 (Utah App. 1993).
This court has stated that "Whether or not a person has the subjective intent
¼ii

to subsequently operate a vehicle is irrelevant to the question of whether the
person has the present ability to start and move the vehicle. It is therefore
permissible for a trial court to find that a person had actual physical control over
a vehicle even though the person did not subjectively intend to exercise it." Id. at
479. Concerning the scope of "actual physical control," this Court has concluded
that "the determination must be made through examining the 'totality of the
circumstances." Id. at ,r 22, citing State v. Bugger; 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, 478
(1971).
Relevant factors for making this determination include, but are not limited to
the following: "(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2)
the position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was running;
(4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; (5)
whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether defendant had
possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's apparent ability to start and move

5

the vehicle; (8) how the car got to where it was found; and (9) whether defendant
drove it there." Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In State v. Sanchez, the Kansas court of appeals recently found that intoxicated
passengers can be in actual physical control of a vehicle's movement and that "a
passenger becomes the driver or operator when he or she grabs the steering
wheel and alters the vehicle's movement." State v. Sanchez, 48 Kan. App. 2d 608,
613, 296 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2013). The "momentary grabbing of the steering wheel
of the vehicle in which [defendant] was riding comes within the ordinary
meaning of the term 'actual physical control.'" In re Arambul, 37 Wash. App. 805,
808,683 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1984). Merely giving a driver direction does not amount
to control over the vehicle equal to that the driver exercises. Benson v. Sorrell, 627
N.E.2d 866 (Ind. App. 1994).
When an ultimate finding of fact is made in violation of a legal guideline, we
correct it under a correction-of-error standard of review. State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d
480, 485 (Utah App 1993) citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah
1993). These guidelines create a field of inquiry within which the trial court can
make its ultimate factual findings. State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App1993).
Whether or not a trial court operated within the proper field of inquiry is a
determination we make using a correction-of-error standard of review. See,

6

Thurman at 846 P.2d at 1271-1272; Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522 (Bench, P.J.,
concurring). The State must prove that Cook had an "existing or present bodily
restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation" over a vehicle. See,

Vialpando at 25 citing Bugger at 442.
A. COOK HAD ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL BY PLACING HER
HANDS ON AND MANEUVERING THE HANDLEBARS AND BY
GIVING COMMANDS TO ANOTHER PERSON IN CONTROL OF
THE FOUR-WHEELER.

Ms. Cook had actual physical control of the four-wheeler. The first way that
the defendant was in actual physical control was by "maneuvering the
handlebars." R 66:15-16. Deputy Adam Burton stated that while reporting to an
abandoned vehicle he observed a four-wheeler coming toward him at a high rate
of speed with three passengers. R 7:12-16. When asked if he had seen who was
steering the four-wheeler Deputy Burton stated that, "Elizabeth Cook had her
hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact." R 7:11-14. Ms. Reid
~

followed up by asking, "You saw that she had in fact had her hand on the
handlebars?" R 7:18-19. Deputy Burton replied, "Yes ma'am." R 7:20.
Additionally, on direct examination, Ms. Cook admitted to having her hands on
the handlebars when they came to a stop to speak with Deputy Burton. R 32:6-11.
However, Ms. Cook alleges that she was not steering at the time and that she was
a passenger on the four-wheeler. R 32:21-23. Ms. Cook testified that her 10 year
7

old daughter was the one in control of operating the large four-wheeler. Id. In

State v. Sanchez, the Kansas court of appeals recently found that intoxicated
passengers can be in actual physical control of a vehicle's movement and that "a
passenger becomes the driver or operator when he or she grabs the steering
wheel and alters the vehicle's movement." State v. Sanchez, 48 Kan. App. 2d 608,
613,296 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2013). The "momentary grabbing of the steering wheel
of the vehicle in which [defendant] was riding comes within the ordinary
meaning of the term ~actual physical control.'" In re Arambul, 37 Wash. App. 805,
808,683 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1984). Ms. Cook alleges that she grabbed the handlebars
while they came to a sudden stop to protect her daughter. R 32:6-11. This
admission, coupled with the testimony of Deputy Burton that he saw Ms. Cook
with her hands on the handlebars shows that Ms. Cook was in control of
"perhaps the most fundamental feature of a moving vehicle - the direction in
which it would travel." Arambul, 37 Wash. App. 805,808, 683 P.2d 1123, 1125
(1984). When Ms. Cook grabbed the steering wheel she was in actual physical
control.
The defendant had actual physical control when she assisted and gave
commands to a person in control. Ms. Cook's daughter acknowledged the fact
that Ms. Cook was helping her operate the four-wheeler. On direct examination,
Ms. Cook's daughter was asked by Mr. Burns whether Ms. Cook was helping her
8

steer the four-wheeler. The daughter replied, uShe did at first because I was
almost crashed into the thing, and then she's like, 'Tum this way,' and all she did
was hold my shoulders." R 46:18-20.
"[A]ctual physical control' in its ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." State v.
GD

Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, 21, 89 P.3d 209 (citations omitted). Black's Law
Dictionary defines the word 'Influence' as, "power exerted over others. To affect,
modify or act upon by physical, mental or moral power, especially in some
gentle, subtle, and gradual way." Henry Black, Black's Law Dictionary 779 (West
Publishing Co.(1990). Ms. Cook was "directing influence" by helping her
daughter steer the four-wheeler, even if momentarily, and was in actual physical
control in doing so. The Defendant alleges that she was merely assisting her
daughter steer by holding her shoulders. R 62:23-25 63:1. Even if this was all she
did, the physical act of helping her daughter turn the handlebars by holding her

~

shoulders is the kind of "gentle, subtle, and gradual" influence intended to
modify her daughter's actions.
Additionally, Ms. Cook gave commands throughout their journey telling her
young daughter to "turn this way" or "hurry up" and "push the brakes."
R46:17-20, RSl:18-19. These commands, coupled with the physical influence of

9

guiding her daughter's shoulders, are the kind of restraint, and domination or
II

regulation" that defines "actual physical control" in its ordinary sense. Vialpando,
2004 UT App 95, 21, 89 P.3d 209. Ms. Cook, and not her daughter, was in actual
physical control of the four-wheeler.
The ultimate factual finding, as well as the legal conclusion, that Cook was in
actual physical control of the four-wheeler was not in violation of legal
guidelines. The evidence shows, and the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates that Ms. Cook was in actual physical control of the four-wheeler.
The "legal content" of the findings and conclusions are not flawed as the district
court's determination was correct. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778,780 (Utah
1986). This Court should affirm the Judgement.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEPUTY
BURTON HAD PROPERLY CONDUCTED THE BAKER TEST AND
THAT THE FIFTEEN MINUET REQUIRMENT WAS SATISIFIED.

"The burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is
on the prosecution. The prosecution must lay a foundation upon which the trial
court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any
necessary legal conclusions." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,778 (Utah 1991), citing

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463
(Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447,451 (Utah 1987).

10
t::\
~

Rule 901 requires that the proponent of an item of evidence authenticate or
identify it with "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." State v. Woodward, 2014 UT App 162, ,r 16, 330 P.3d 1238;

quoting UTAH R. EVID. 901(a). "Proper authentication does not require
conclusive proof but, instead, requires only that the trial court determine that
there is 'evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of [a]
condition' of fact." Id at ,r 7, citing State v. C.D.L, 2011 UT App 55, 124,250 P.3d
69 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 104(b) (2011)) (alteration in original).
In order for a defendant's BAC results to be admissible, "the State must
present evidence, inter alia, that: (1) the intoxilyzer machine had been properly
checked by a trained technician and that the machine was in proper working
condition at the time of the test; (2) the test was administered correctly by a
qualified operator; and (3) a police officer observed the defendant during the
fifteen minutes immediately preceding the test to ensure that the defendant
introduced nothing into his or her mouth during that time." State v. Vialpando,
2004 UT App 95, ,r 14, 89 P.3d 209; See In re Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Utah 1977)

(Maughan,]., dissenting) (citing State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846,355 P.2d 806, 809-10
(1960).

11

11

A trial court's determination that there was a proper foundation for the

admission of evidence ... [is reviewed for] an abuse of discretion. This means
that we will reverse the trial court's decision to admit evidence only if the ruling
is beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Woodward, 2014 UT App 162, ,r 14,
330 P.3d 1283; citing State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,r 17, 256 P.3d 1102
(alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant matter, the State presented evidence that the "Intoxilyzer
machine had been properly checked by a trained technician and that the machine
was in proper working condition at the time of the test." Vialpando, 2004 UT App
95, ,r 14, 89 P.3d 209. Deputy Burton testified that he had been certified to use the
Intoxilyzer and the State submitted certificates showing that the Intoxilyzer was
calibrated at the time Ms. Cook was tested. R 14:6-16. The State also showed that
II

a police officer observed the defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately
preceding the test to ensure that the defendant introduced nothing into his or her
mouth during that time." Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, 1 14, 89 P.3d 209. Deputy
Burton testified that he observed the Baker time at 14:34. R 17:13. Deputy Burton
then testified that he did not leave the room for any reason and observed that
Ms. Cook had not belched or regurgitated anything, nor did she eat or drink
until she blew into the machine at the time of 14:51. R 17:20-23, R 18:12.

12

The trial court found that the fifteen minutes required by Baker had been met.
R 23:15-16. The trial court found that a proper foundation "upon which the trial
court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any
necessary legal conclusions" had been satisfied and that the State did not need to
prove that the two separate time pieces used to record Baker time were
synchronized. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,778 (Utah 1991), citing State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886,890 (Utah 1989). The court was satisfied that the two time pieces
and a two minuet cushion that left seventeen minuets from when Baker was
observed and when the test was administered were enough to meet the
requirement. R 23:17-18. "Proper authentication does not require conclusive
proof but, instead, requires only that the trial court determine that there is
~ evidence sufficient to

support a finding of the fulfillment of [a] condition' of

fact." Id at ,r 7, citing State v. C.D.L, 2011 UT App 55, ,r 24, 250 P.3d 69 (quoting
UTAH R. EVID. 104(b) (2011)) (alteration in original).
The State presented evidence and foundational support that the
requirements for Baker had been satisfied. The trial courts determination in this
matter regarding those foundational requirements were well within its discretion
and within "the limits of reasonability." Woodward, 2014 UT App 162, ,r 14,330
P.3d 1283. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and therefore Ms. Cook's

13

BAC should not be excluded, and this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling.

III.

MR. BURNS DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHEN USING HIS REASONABLE PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT HE DECIDED NOT TO FILE THE MOTION TO
SUPRESS.

The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court stated that "counsel can
deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel simply by
failing to render adequate legal assistance." Id. The Utah Court of Appeals in
Curry stated that "'[u]nder both the United States Constitution and the Utah

Constitution, [Defendant] had the right to assistance of counsel at all critical
stages of his criminal proceeding." Ibid, 2006 UT App 390, 16, 147 P.3d 483, citing

Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, (Utah App.1990).
Subsequently, a two prong test to determine ineffective assistance of
counsel claims has been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Houston.
The two prongs of the test ~at the defendant must show is that the defendant's
'"counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,

14

which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment.' Second, the defendant must demonstrate 'that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant." State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40 70,353 P.3d 55; citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d
461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). To show ineffective assistance of counsel the
defendant must show that, "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome ... would have been different." State v.

Gailey, 2015 UT App 249, 14 P.3d, quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah
1995). This court "will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." State v.

Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. A defendant must therefore overcome the
strong presumptions that counsel's performance fell "within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance" and that "under the circumstances, the
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id.
In the instant matter, Ms. Cook's counsel Mr. Burns did not render
ineffective assistance

15

of counsel. Defendant fails to rebut the strong presumption that his counsel
reasonably chose not to follow through on his motion to suppress. The decision
of Mr. Burns not to follow through on his motion to suppress was a "legitimate
strategic choice" and this court has stated that it "will not second-guess
trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices might
appear in retrospect." Id. The trial court found that the burden of demonstrating
the admissibility of the proffered evidence was satisfied by the prosecution. The
prosecution laid a foundation upon which the trial court made necessary
preliminary factual findings to reach the necessary legal conclusions. see State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), citing State v. c, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah
1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,463 (Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447,
451 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence against
him was overwhelming. There is no reason to believe that "but for counsel's
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome ...
would have been different." State v. Gailey, 2015 UT App 249, 14 P.3d, quoting

State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995). Ms. Cook's counsel Mr. Burns did
not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Cook has failed to meet her
burden as required by Strickland in establishing an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim when trial counsel had a reasonable basis for that decision.
16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on 20 May 2016.
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Also, in accordance with the Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a
Courtesy Brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf):

•

was filed with the Court and served on appellant.

Deputy Iron County Attorney
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary or included.

r~JE::>
.._.

Chad E. Dotson
Deputy Iron County Attorney
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